

*„Ensuring the Operational Capability
of UN Peacekeeping Missions“*



COMMITTEE GUIDE
SPECIAL CONFERENCE



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Personal Introduction

Honourable Delegates,

My name is Gareth Edwards and I am honoured to be one of the Chairs of the Special Conference at OLMUN 2013. I was born in Gießen, Hessen and lived in Cambridge, England for eight years. I am 17 years old, currently in the 11th grade at the Gymnasium Bad Zwischenahn-Edevecht. I enjoy playing the piano and I am part of our school orchestra and paramedic team.

This is my second attendance of the OLMUN and the first time as a Chair. Last year, I took part as the delegate for Costa Rica in the Special Conference and was thrilled by the concept of MUNs. This year, I am looking forward to serving as a Chair, overseeing the interesting debates on our topic.

Yours sincerely,

Gareth Edwards



Dear Delegates,

My name is Timo Reinders and I am 18 years old. I live in Oldenburg and graduated this year from Herbartgymnasium Oldenburg. I am interested in literature, philosophy and politics. And I love debating and getting to know new people. This is why I like MUNs so much and this is why I am your chair at Special Conference 2013.

This year will be my 6th MUN and my 4th OLMUN. I participated at BER-MUN 2012 in Berlin and MUNOB 2012 in Bucharest. I really look forward meeting every single of you, having amazing talks and debates and getting to know you and your stories.

Best wishes,

Timo Reinders



OLMUN 2013 - Committee Guide

Special Conference

Honourable Delegates,

My name is Kirsten Fischer and I am very delighted to be able to serve as one of this year's chairs of the Special Conference. Currently, I live in Lotte, a small town near Osnabrück and will graduate from the Graf-Adolf-Gymnasium in Tecklenburg this year. Afterwards, I plan on studying either neurobiology or bioengineering.



This will be my fourth MUN overall and my second time chairing at a conference. My first contact with MUN was rather coincidental: Our MUN director asked me to join after my student exchange to Canada and advertised it as a great possibility to practice one's English. However, participating in my first MUN in Istanbul with over 600 other students from all over the world and experiencing the unique atmosphere of international meeting and dialogue as well as great discussions, totally got my hooked upon MUN. Now, I am really looking forward to participating in this year's OLMUN and to an interesting debate.

Yours sincerely,

Kirsten Fischer

1. The Special Conference

The Special Conference (SpC) is free to put any issue of international politics on its agenda. Unlike all other committees it is therefore not limited to any content framework. Thus, topics that have been discussed in the Special Conference vary a lot covering diverse fields of international politics such as the Millennium Development Goals, oil conflicts in Africa and modern forms of piracy.

Since every country at OLMUN possesses a seat in the SpC, it is the biggest committee along with the GA 3rd and GA 4th. Due to its size, topics discussed in the SpC must not restrict to regional conflicts, but need to be of global relevance concerning a great amount of countries.

This year's topic is „*Ensuring the Operational Capability of UN Peacekeeping Missions*“. In these days, peacekeeping missions face a lack of reliability and support among the UN member states and are often not capable of solving conflicts and securing peace in a sufficient way. This year's SpC deals with the structural problems of peacekeeping mandates and develops ideas for a considered and profound reform since peacekeeping missions are an essential element of United Nations peace policy.

2. General Information

UN Peacekeeping Missions are, as the name implies, missions to preserve the peace in countries that have recently experienced a war (e.g. civil war). Since the foundation of the UN in 1945, 53 missions have been completed. Currently, there are 14 UN Peacekeeping Missions and one special political mission. They are all led by the *Department of Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO).

Peacekeeping is based on three main principals: the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Along with the goal to preserve peace in certain countries, it also has the goal to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, protect and promote human rights, support the organization of elections, assist in restoring the rule of law and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

There are about 81,000 troops and military observers, 12,000 police personnel, 5,000 civilian personnel, 12,000 civilian staff and 2,000 UN Volunteers serving the DPKO. As the UN does not have its own military force, it relies on contributions from its Member States. All member states are legally obliged to pay a certain sum of money to back peacekeeping since June 2004.


As of 2011, the main troop-contributing countries were Bangladesh (10,498), Pakistan (9,333), India (8,093), Nigeria (5,662), Ethiopia (5,233), Nepal (4,454), Egypt (4,166), Jordan (4,008), Rwanda (3,670) and Ghana (2,995). Developing nations contribute more than developed nations because forces from smaller countries avoid evoking thoughts of imperialism. E.g., in December 2005, Eritrea expelled all Americans, Russians, Europeans and Canadians from the peacekeeping operation on their border with Ethiopia. On top of that, developing countries profit from contributing to the UN peacekeeping missions due to the reimbursement by the UN (Per peacekeeper per month: \$1,028 for allowances; \$303 supplementary pay for specialists; \$68 for clothing, gear and equipment; \$5 for personal weaponry).

3. Deployment of UN Peacekeeping Forces

After a peace treaty has been arranged, the conflicting parties may ask the UN for a peacekeeping force. If the Security Council approves the mission, the DPKO plans the mission. The senior leadership team is selected and the DPKO seeks contributions from member nations (supplies, troops etc.). The government of the nation who needs the Peacekeeping force must agree to the size and strength of the force and the *Rules of Engagement* must be approved by the conflict parties and the SC. After all this has been done, the SC must give a final approval to the mission. Then the peacekeepers are deployed.

3.1 History

Peacekeeping was developed during the Cold War to resolve conflicts between states by observing the peace process between warring parties who were in need of a neutral party. The peacekeeping forces were unarmed or lightly armed and under the command of the UN.



Current (dark blue) and Past (light blue) Peacekeeping Operations

The first peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was launched in 1948. It took place in

the new state Israel where conflict between Israel and the Arab states had a ceasefire. Today, the UNTSO is still in operation. A year later, a new peacekeeping mission, the *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan* (UNMOGIP), was launched to observe the relations between Pakistan and India.

A large variety of peacekeeping missions have been launched since then, most notably the end of the Korean War 1953 and the response to the Suez Crisis 1956. The UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.

After the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping missions rose rapidly due to the fact that Russia, formally the Soviet Union, stopped vetoing a large number of operations. Since then, peacekeeping also involved more non-military elements, e.g. elections. The SC made larger peacekeeping missions to also help implement peace agreements. The DPKO was created in 1992 to support the increased demand for peacekeeping missions.

Complex and successful missions, e.g. in Mozambique, were ongoing but the UN overestimated what the UN peacekeeping could accomplish. They sent peacekeepers to conflict zones like Somalia where they had no foothold to achieve their goal of ensuring peace and they failed.

3.2 Example for a successful Peacekeeping Operation (Mozambique)

Between 1977 and 1992 there was a civil war in Mozambique between the Marxist *Front for Liberation of Mozambique* (FRELIMO) and the anti-Communist *Mozambique Resistance Movement* (RENAMO) because the president Samora Machel established a one-party state with Marxist principals. The RENAMO wanted a multi-party governmental system but the FRELIMO refused and so the civil war started. One million people died in fighting and from starvation, 1.7 million fled to the neighbouring states, five million were displaced and many more were injured.

After the death of Samora Machel in a plane crash, his successor, Joaquim Chissano, put reforms in place that changed Mozambique from a Marxist to a capitalist nation. He talked with the RENAMO and a new constitution was enacted in 1990, providing a multi-party governmental system, free elections and a capitalist economy. The civil war ended in 1992 with the *Rome General Peace Accords*. From then on, a peacekeeping operation, the *United Nations Operation in Mozambique* (ONUMOZ) was established to monitor the progress of peace in Mozambique between the FRELIMO and the RENAMO.

The ONUMOZ had about 6,600 troops, 350 observers, 1,100 police officers, 350 international staff, 500 local staff and 900 election observers. They faced large resistances carrying out their mission. They could not collect the weapons until November 1993 due to distrust between the two parties. This also resulted in the first election, which was to be held in October 1993, not taking place. The elections were held a year later. They disarmed approximately 76,000 fighters, collected 155,000 fire arms, trained about 10,000 soldiers of the new army and repatriated most of the five million refugees. They also displaced people uprooted by the civil war. The ONUMOZ mandate ended with the newly elected government and the swearing in of the president in 1994.

4. Criticism and Problems

Although some successful peacekeeping missions have been launched in the history of UN, various difficulties and problems occurred, that often lead peacekeeping missions to fail.

4.1 Sexual abuse

It has been observed that child prostitution and human trafficking rapidly rises in areas where peacekeeping forces are deployed.¹ There have been many cases of sexual abuse of women and children by UN troops. This seriously undermines the credibility and acceptance of UN peacekeeping missions and strongly contradicts with the aims of peacekeeping missions and the principles of UN Charter. In the 1996 UN study "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children" the former first lady of Mozambique Graça Machel documented: „In 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution.“ Although the sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers is a very urgent and serious problem, there are no sufficient measures to investigate and prosecute those crimes. There are no proper juristic structures and guidelines on how to deal with cases of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers. Further more the US government demands juristic immunity for their soldiers, because it fears political motivated charges. However, there need to be measures taken to guard the guardians.

4.2 Lack of Guidelines

Since 1948 there are two conditions that need to be fulfilled before any peacekeeping mission can be launched. First all parties have to be in a ceasefire and need to approve to the peacekeeping mission. Today these strict conditions have been softened and UN peacekeeping troops are deployed into current war regions. The task of UN peacekeepers is not to create peace but to preserve it. Therefore they often have been overcharged with keeping a peace that did not exist in the first place, like in Darfur. Moreover the regional conflict parties did not accept the peacekeepers as a neutral mediator but saw them as an invader and a new enemy that has to be fought and expelled.

4.3 Lack of Resources

Since the UN does not have own troops, it depends on their member states to contribute troops and resources to the UN peacekeeping missions. Before any mandate can be awarded, the secretary general has to beggar for troops and national contingents. It became obvious that this voluntary provision of troops does not work. Theoretically there are more than 150.000 soldiers available, but when it comes to concrete plans, most of the governments refuse to provide the peacekeeping missions with the necessary resources. When there is a peacekeeping army composed, member states often give outmoded weaponry and unqualified soldiers because they do not want to weaken their own army. This general unwillingness of the member states to provide the peacekeeping missions with proper equipment makes a quick and efficient intervention impossible.

4.4 Lack of Organization and Structure

The fact that many soldiers from various countries work together in a peacekeeping mission often leads to inefficiency and dysfunctional organization caused by language barriers, cultural differences and unclear command structures. Due to the inappropriate equipment and lack of support,

¹ <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1126/p06s02-wogi.html>

peacekeepers are often not able to defend themselves and are taken as hostages. In addition there are not enough experts to plan and support the military operations. The DPKO, which plans and supports the peacekeeping missions, is understaffed and not capable of organizing the peacekeeping missions properly. The operations of 27,000 UN soldiers worldwide are monitored by only 32 military experts in New York. For the amount of 8,000 police forces in operations there are only 9 police officers in charge of supervising the missions.

In Srebrenica in 1995 during the Bosnian War, 400 Dutch peacekeeping soldiers were not willing or not able to protect the civilian population due to their equipment or mandate. This led to the massacre of Srebrenica with more than 8,000 victims, which is considered the worst war crime on European soil since the Holocaust. This underlines the urgency to reform and improve the UN peacekeeping mandates.

4.5 Lack of Political Unity

Due to the different political positions or simply the unwillingness of its member states the SC is often unable to react fast enough. In 1994 during the Rwandan Civil War the SC needed more than three weeks to decide on a peacekeeping mission. Due to this hesitation it could not prevent the genocide in Rwanda with more than one million victims. Today the genocide in Rwanda is considered the biggest failure of international peacekeeping in UN history.²

To prevent these current problems, the SC often transfers peacekeeping mandates to an external party e.g. single states or organizations like the NATO or the African Union (AU). This approach avoids some of the organizational problems of UN peacekeeping missions, but is not a long-term solution, because these external parties do not always stick to the mandates but have their own aims and interests.

5. Proposed Reforms

Due to the occurrence of several difficulties and problems concerning peacekeeping missions, there have been different ideas of how to improve the capacity of peacekeeping missions such as a central organization of all peacekeeping missions as well as increased financial support and more commitment of member states.

5.1 Brahimi Analysis

As a response to the mentioned issues, the former Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed in 2000 a panel of diplomats, peacekeeping officers and other experts that were well acquainted of the topic. It was named the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and aimed to assess the shortcomings of the then existing system and to make specific and realistic change improvement suggestions.

It focused upon shortcomings in the existing system, frank and realistic recommendations for change, political and strategic issues, operational and organizational issues. The result was the Brahimi report named after the panel's chairman Lakhdar Brahimi and it called for renewed political commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support. In the report it is underlined that peacekeeping mandates need to be clearer, more credible and achievable. Furthermore, it is highlighted that peacekeeping troops need to be properly resourced and equipped by the nations providing them.

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_Genocide

Measures of how to implement these changes have been revitalized by the DPKO in its 'Peace Operations 2010' reform agenda.³ It includes increase in personnel, the harmonization of the conditions of service of field and headquarters staff, the development of guidelines and standard operating procedures, and improving the partnership arrangement between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), African Union and European Union.

5.2 Rapid Reaction Force

In order to prevent delays as occurred in Rwanda, it has been suggested to form a rapid reaction force: a standing group, administered by the UN and deployed by the Security Council that receives its troops and support from current Security Council members and is ready for quick deployment in the event of future genocides. This has been envisaged in the 43th Article of the UN-Charter, however this has failed so far due to missing agreements concerning this topic.

5.3 Restructuring of the UN secretariat

In 2007, the DPKO has been expanded by the Department of Field Support (DFS). It provides support in the areas of finance, logistics, Information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration to help missions promote peace and security. The DPKO concentrates upon political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and maintaining contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors.

5.4 Conduct and discipline reform

The Secretary General enforced a zero tolerance policy concerning sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in host nations. In 2008, the so called 'Capstone doctrine' has been adapted which sets out the guiding principles and core objectives of UN Peacekeeping operations. Additionally, there has been a conduct upon the assistance to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel in 2008.

These reforms are only intended to give food for thought, you are kindly encouraged to come up with new and different ideas. While doing so, keep in mind the committee's range of action.

³ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/reform.shtml>

Organizational Matters

What do you have to bring to OLMUN '13?

1. A draft resolution in which you propose what changes you want to make to the current system. Each draft resolution should be at least 1 page long. You can find tips in the handbook of OLMUN '13.
2. A policy statement that shows your country's position towards the problems and what your country thinks should be done. These will be presented before we start lobbying. The policy statement should not be more than 150 words and should outline 2-4 major points of your resolution.
3. The most important thing to bring is all your enthusiasm about MUN-Conferences. Be open to meeting new friends and debate with the other countries about the problems. Make this year's Special Conference an experience we will not forget for a long time.

Contact

If you have any questions concerning the committee's topic, how to conduct your research, procedural matters, how to write the resolution or anything else, contact us at spc@olmun.org. We would also read your resolutions and policy statements, correct them according to style and content and, if wished, forward them to fellow delegates.

We are looking forward to an interesting and constructive MUN experience with all of you from June 4th to June 7th!

Yours sincerely

Kirsten Fischer, Gareth Edwards, Timo Reinders

Useful Links

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peacekeeping>

<https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_where_UN_peacekeepers_are_currently_deployed

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_UN_peacekeeping_missions

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_United_Nations_Peacekeeping

http://archive2.globalsolutions.org/issues/summary_brahimi_report