

# Oldenburg Model United Nations



## Committee Guide to the United Nations Security Council

*Nuclear proliferation of the DPR Korea*

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### Personal Introduction

Dear Delegates!

My name is Tjalke Weber and I am honored to serve as Chair of the Security Council at OLMUN 2012. I am 22 years old, studying German-Italian Studies at the Universities of Bonn and Florence and am currently finishing my bachelor's thesis in Italy.

OLMUN was my very first MUN experience. Since I participated as delegate 2006, I have been fascinated by the idea of political simulations to introduce the idea and working methods of the UN to young people. That is why I have been involved in 18 MUN Conferences so far – amongst others as Delegate, Editor in Chief, Chair and also Secretary-General.



Since 2009, I am part of the United Nations Youth Association (UNYA) Germany. This umbrella organization of national (M)UN associations which are run by both high school and university students aims at further promoting the idea and working methods of the UN, especially among young people in Germany. Currently, I am spokesperson of UNYA Germany and its national representative within the international United Nations Youth Associations Network (UNYANET).

In my (rare) free time, I enjoy traveling, exploring foreign countries and cultures, learning languages, taking photos, meeting friends, hosting couchsurfers, preparing typical Italian food, reading and juggling. Or I simply try to compensate my constant lack of sleep.

I hope that you will be inspired by your participation in OLMUN 2012, that you will be infected by the MUN virus as well and that you will become a passionate UN youth ambassador!

Looking forward to seeing you in Oldenburg in June,

Tjalke Weber

# OLMUN 2012 - Committee Guide

## *United Nations Security Council*

Honored Delegates of the Security Council,

I have the great pleasure to be your Chair together with Tjalke Weber at OLMUN 2012. I am 22 years old and study Industrial Engineering at a small university in northern Germany. Besides my study I work for the medical company Dräger and at the moment I am on an internship for the same enterprise in Shanghai.

My MUN career started in 2008 at Model United Nations Schleswig-Holstein as a delegate of the General Assembly. Through the last years I held several positions at MUN conferences and found my way to OLMUN this year.



Year after year I became more passionate about MUN and more interested into the work of the United Nations. On the behalf of my Co-Chair Tjalke Weber and me, I wish you a great experience at OLMUN and hope that you will catch the same MUN virus which holds us in its grip.

If you have any question regarding MUN or the rules of procedure, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Best regards,

Anika Splettstößer

### The United Nations Security Council



The Security Council

**The United Nations Security Council (SC)**, established in 1946, is responsible for the “maintenance of international peace and security”<sup>1</sup> (Art. 24, 1). Its composition, functions and powers are defined in Chapter V of the UN Charter. Being considered the United Nations’ „most powerful body“<sup>2</sup>, the SC has to be able to react immediately and function continuously. Therefore, a representative of each member must constantly be present at the UN Headquarters in New York.<sup>3</sup>

The SC consists of fifteen members. **Five permanent members** (so-called „P5“) which are invested with a veto power are the Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The **ten non-permanent** members are elected for two year-terms by the UN General Assembly and are not open for immediate re-election. They are currently Azerbaijan (end of term 2013), Colombia (2012), Germany (2012), Guatemala (2013), India (2012), Morocco (2013), Pakistan (2013), Portugal (2012), South Africa (2012) and Togo (2013).<sup>4</sup> Each member has one vote; the presidency rotates monthly according to the English alphabetical order.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html>

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_background.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html)

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_background.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html)



Its functions and powers according to the UN Charter are<sup>6</sup>

- to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
- to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
- to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
- to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
- to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
- to take military action against an aggressor;
- to recommend the admission of new Members;
- to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in „strategic areas“;
- to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.

In its key task of maintaining peace and security, the SC performs three main functions: it assists in the peaceful settlement of disputes, it establishes and oversees UN peace-keeping forces, and last but not least, it may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action.<sup>7</sup> In the first place, however, the Security Council's most important task is to prevent armed conflict and to seek a diplomatic solution.

When a threat to international peace is identified and brought before the SC, the Council's first action is usually to propose to involved conflict parties to find a peaceful solution. Sometimes, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so. The SC is the only UN body that can send UN peace-keeping forces. It may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action.<sup>8</sup>

**Decisions** on procedural matters require nine votes in favor. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes as well, including the P5. This is referred to as the rule of “great power unanimity” or “veto” power. However, a resolution can be passed if permanent members abstain from the vote.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_functions.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html)

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/gensc.html>

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_background.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html)

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>

# OLMUN 2012 - Committee Guide

## United Nations Security Council

Period	China*	France	Britain	US	USSR/ Russia	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>261</b>
2008	1	-	-	-	1	2
2007	1	-	-	-	1	2
2006	-	-	-	2	-	2
2005	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	-	-	-	2	1	3
2003	-	-	-	2	-	2
2002	-	-	-	2	-	2
2001	-	-	-	2	-	2
2000	-	-	-	-	-	0
1999	1	-	-	-	-	1
1998	-	-	-	-	-	0
1997	1	-	-	2	-	3
1996	-	-	-	-	-	0
1986-95	-	3	8	24	2	37
1976-85	-	9	11	34	6	60
1966-75	2	2	10	12	7	33
1956-65	-	2	3	-	26	31
1946-55	(1*)	2	-	-	80	83

Use of the Veto from 1946 to 2008

There had been some proposals for a SC reform, but the GA has been unable to find an agreement until now.<sup>10</sup> Despite all criticism, the Security Council remains a powerful body whose decisions are binding for all Member States of the UN under the Charter.

## Introduction

The end of World War II and the capitulation of Japan due to the devastating power of nuclear explosion were the begin of a new era. After the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki nations faced the prospect of enormous casualties and containment of their countries for years to come in case of warfare with nations in possession of nuclear missiles. The remaining “superpowers” the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union possessed these weapons of mass destruction. The result was a mutual assured destruction and the cold war. Both could not risk an open war with each other as they would then face their own destruction. Later France, Great Britain and China developed nuclear weapons on their own accord.

To limit the threat of nuclear destruction the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968. Only nations who developed nuclear missiles before this date were allowed to keep them legally. These nations are the five permanent members of the Security

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform.html>



Council: USA, China, Soviet Union (now Russia), Great Britain and France. All other signing nations promised not to conduct a nuclear weapon program. In exchange the five nuclear nations promise not to attack them with nuclear missiles and let all other participate in a technology exchange regarding the civil usage of nuclear energy.

However, for some nations the prospect of developing nuclear weapons of mass destruction weighs heavier than the protection of the Treaty.

Among those are Israel, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea. The threat of the nuclear proliferation of North Korea will be discussed in this paper.

### **Korean War and General Historical Background**

Until the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Korean island was ruled as an independent kingdom. This changed through the occupation by Japan between 1910 and 1945. After Japan was defeated and the World War II ended, Korea was divided at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel into two parts. The northern part was put under the custody of the Soviet Union and the southern part was governed by the USA.

In 1948 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed by Kim Il Sung. The regime kept tight relations with the Soviet Union and announced their main objective to be a reunification of Korea under the communist rule of the Korean Worker's party (KWP).

In 1949 the first military raids into the recently founded Republic of Korea (ROK) began, which led to the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. The war ended with an armistice between the two nations. Until today both nations are officially still at war with each other and the demilitarized zone around the border is heavily guarded.

After the attempt to reunify Korea by military intervention failed, President Kim Il Sung of proclaimed the "Juche" doctrine. In this the DPRK states their aim to become a self-reliant state. After the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991 the DPRK lost one of their main supporters. Although the DPRK continued to keep tight relations with other communist states in Asia (with the most important being the People's Republic of China), the humanitarian situation was declining. Estimations are that 2.5 million North Koreans died of famine during the 1990s.<sup>11</sup>

### **Nuclear Proliferation**

To secure their regime the DPRK emphasized on strengthening their military and on the development of a nuclear program. This approach was stated as the "Songun" doctrine. This strategy was due to the fact that the DPRK felt surrounded by hostile forces. In the south by an anticommunist regime supported by the USA and in the east by Japan, which had occupied Korea in the past. This was further amplified by the deployment of nuclear missiles in violation of the armistice agreement in the ROK and the refusal of the Soviet Union to take the DPRK under its nuclear umbrella.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae\\_Bong/3053](http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae_Bong/3053)

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae\\_Bong/3053](http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae_Bong/3053)

Therefore the DPRK asked for the help of the Soviet Union to develop their own nuclear weapons in 1963. Their petition was rejected by Moscow and later also by the PR China. Instead the Soviet Union offered to help Pyongyang to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program.

However the DPRK feared that the Soviet Union would not defend them against an invasion of the anti-communist South, because they had seemingly abandoned Cuba during the missile crisis in 1962.

This strengthened the belief of the North Korean government that they need military strength to defend themselves. Therefore the DPRK recruited an army of several hundred thousand soldiers and started to develop conventional weapon systems.

However in the 1970 due to the failure of the North Korean industry to keep up with the economic development of the ROK, the regime focused again on the development of nuclear weapons. This was seen as a less expensive alternative to the development of conventional weapons and the best chance to protect the DPRK from external threats. Especially after the support from the dismembered Soviet Union disappeared, the threat of nuclear weapons was seen as the best alternative to gain economic assistance and security guarantees.<sup>13</sup>

Although the DPRK joined the NPT in 1985, the international community suspected that the nuclear energy plant in Yongbyon was used to enrich Plutonium. At this stage the USA offered better relationships if the NPT was kept. To show their goodwill the nuclear weapons on the southern part of the peninsula were withdrawn as part of the START agreement.<sup>14</sup>

In 1992 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tried to inspect the plant in Yongbyon, but met difficulties during the process. One year later they came to the conclusion that they cannot assure that the DPRK is not producing nuclear weapons. In the same year Pyongyang regime threatened to leave the NPT.<sup>15</sup>

The result of the following diplomatic discourse was the Agreed Framework. In this the DPRK agreed to dismantle their nuclear facilities in exchange for two civil light-water reactors and oil shipments. In the aftermath the diplomatic tension eased slightly, also due to the Sunshine policy of the ROK beginning in 1998. This changed in 2002 as President Georg W. Bush denounced the DPRK as part of an „Axis of Evil“ and the DPRK attacked a South Korean naval ship.

The situation declined further when the DPRK announced its retreat from the NPT on the 10<sup>th</sup> January 2003. To this date the DPRK is the only country to abandon the treaty.

Therefore the regime lost the protection of the treaty, but could now „legally“ try to acquire nuclear weapons. Internationally there were doubts that the DPRK can master this task, but the regime announced its first underground test in 2006. This lead to increased tensi-

<sup>13</sup> [http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae\\_Bong/3053](http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae_Bong/3053)

<sup>14</sup> [http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae\\_Bong/3053](http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae_Bong/3053)

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1994\\_r/bod3.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1994_r/bod3.htm)

on between the Korean countries and finally the Sunshine policy was abandoned in 2008. A year later the DPRK claimed a second successful underground test. The international community could only partly prove this as there was seismic activity on the date of test which could be the result of a nuclear bomb but no radiation could be measured.<sup>16</sup>

Further aggressions from the North Korean regime were conducted in 2010. On the 26<sup>th</sup> March a submarine torpedo sank the Cheonan, a ROK Navy vessel, and 46 seamen were killed. Although Russia and China doubted the reports that the DPRK was the culprit, the international community blamed Pyongyang. Later that year on the 23<sup>rd</sup> October the North Korean artillery opened fire on the South Korean island Yeonpyeong. Troops stationed on the island fired back. Several civilians were killed on Yeonpyeong while North Korean casualties are unknown. Although both incidents involved conventional weapons, they destabilized the region further.

Parallel to the development of nuclear weapons Pyongyang constructed and tested middle to long range missiles. Without those it would not be able to launch their weapons to the ROK, Japan and the USA. The latest of those was the Unha 3 rocket which was unsuccessfully launched on the 13<sup>th</sup> April 2012.<sup>17</sup>

### **2006 Missile Tests**

On July 5, 2006 the DPR Korea tested at least seven different missiles that landed in the Sea of Japan in international waters. The first launches (early morning hours of July 5 in Korea) came minutes before the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery in Florida (midday July 4 in the U.S.). The range was estimated to be between 4,000 and 6,000 km. However, at least one missile failed after few seconds of flight. The short flight of Taepo-dong-2 made it difficult to collect enough data. Neither the target nor the technical stage of the missile were identified. The aim is considered to be either a threat to the U.S., or a transport to space or the proof for potential partners that the technology works (Iranian officials may have been present at the launch).

One day later, officials of the North Korean foreign ministry declared the tests had been „successful“ and part of „regular military drills to strengthen self-defense“. Korea kept insisting that it has the right to do so and warned of „stronger physical actions“ if it were put under pressure by the international community.

The U.N. Security Council scheduled an emergency meeting for July 5, 2006 and agreed on taking action. Japan, with the support of the U. S. and the UK, introduced a measure that would have restricted countries from transferring funds, material, or technology to North Korea. Russia and China, with veto power, resisted the resolution, saying a press statement should be issued.

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1994\\_r/bod3.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1994_r/bod3.htm)

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/13/us-usa-korea-aid-idUSBRE83C0ZD20120413>

### 2006 Nuclear test

On October 9, 2006 the DPR Korea conducted an underground nuclear test. It announced its intention to do so three days before and by doing so became the first nation to warn of a nuclear test. Until then, it was unclear whether North Korea had managed to build nuclear weapons, because the country conducted several missile tests, but no nuclear test so far.

Some seismic activity as well as some radioactive output were detected. However, it is not sure whether it was a successful nuclear test, a misfired one (‘fizzle’) or not a nuclear test at all, but some other explosion. The blast is estimated to have had an explosive force of less than one kiloton, which is very few, and most experts believe that the DPRK is not able to mount a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.

On October 17, 2006 North Korea declared U.S. sanctions as a declaration of war. Several nations suspected a second nuclear test to be carried out despite the international pressure.

Three days later, Kim Jong-il apologized for the nuclear test, declared its country wished to return to talk with the UN and had no future plans to test another nuclear device. On October 31, 2006, North Korea agreed to rejoin six-party talks.<sup>18</sup>

### *International reaction: UN SC Resolution 1718* <sup>19</sup>

The international reaction was harsh and nearly all nations condemned the nuclear test. The SC adopted Resolution 1718 by an unanimous vote, imposing weapons and military sanctions on the DPRK aimed at preventing North Korea from acquiring or spreading nuclear technology. The resolution does not contain the threat of military action, although acting on behalf of Chapter VII. The resolution condemns the 9 October test being a violation of previous resolutions; demands the DPRK to „not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile“, to return to the NPT, to allow examinations by the IAEA and to stop existing nuclear programs; calls on Member States to not cooperate with the DPRK in order to prevent the trading and transport of material used for the nuclear program; allows inspection of cargo from and to the DPRK; establishes a Committee to collect information and track sanctions<sup>20</sup>; imposes an asset freeze, travel ban and ban of luxury goods; and calls upon the DPRK to return to the six-party talks „without precondition“.

North Korea’s UN envoy left the room after protesting against the resolution. He accused the SC of supporting U.S. Pressure. Later, North Korean representatives considered the resolution a „declaration of war“ against its country.<sup>21</sup> France inspected a North Korean ship under resolution 1718 on November 16, 2006.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The six-party talks are international negotiations regarding the North Korean nuclear program, including the U.S., North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. Cf @ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20261&Cr=DPRK&Cr1=,http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/res/1718%282006%29,http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8853.doc.htm> and <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6051704.stm>

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml>

<sup>21</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6057718.stm>

<sup>22</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6154986.stm>

### Missile launch on April 5, 2009

Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 was a satellite the North Korean government claimed to have placed into orbit in April 2009. According to the North Korean government, a rocket carrying the satellite was launched on April 5, 2009. However, officials in South Korea and the United States reported that the rocket and any payload had fallen into the Pacific Ocean.

Prior to the launch, concern was raised that the rocket was a Taepodong-2, and the launch might be a trial run of technology that could be used to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile. The launch was sharply condemned by the U.S. and the EU. On April 13, 2009, the SC issued a Presidential Statement condemning the launch as a violation of Resolution 1718. As a reaction, DPRK left the six party talks on the following day. On April 24, the IAEA officially declared North Korea „a fully fledged nuclear power“.

### 2009 Nuclear Test

On May 25, 2009 an underground detonation was conducted by the DPRK, being considered the second nuclear test after 2006. Experts agreed that the test was successful and the yield estimated between 1 and 20 kilotons. Following the test, Pyongyang also conducted several missile tests; it is said to keep surveillance planes away from the country and in reaction to preparations of the SC. It is believed that the test was conducted to demonstrate strength even in the situation of possible inner weakness: Kim Jong-un was about to take over power.

#### *Reaction: SC Resolution 1874* <sup>23</sup>

The test was nearly universally condemned by the international community. The UN SC unanimously adopted Resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009, imposing tougher commercial and economic sanctions on the country, including the inspection of North Korean ships, a wider ban on arms sales and other financial measures. The resolution includes:

- Requiring the North Korean government to return immediately to the six-party talks and renounce its announcement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Preventing financial services that could contribute to the nuclear or ballistic missile related programs.
- Instructing member states not to provide financial assistance to the DPRK nuclear program, or enter into loans with the country, except for humanitarian or developmental reasons.
- Extending the arms embargo on North Korea by banning all weapons exports from the country and most imports, with an exception to small arms, light weapons and related material – though member states must notify the Security Council five days prior to selling the weapons.
- Demanding that North Korea halt its nuclear weapons program and conduct no further nuclear or missile tests.
- Asking member states to notify the Council of steps they are taking to implement the sanctions within 45 days.

<sup>23</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8097370.stm>, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/12/us-korea-north-un-text-sb-idUST-RE55B4AZ20090612>



- Affirming the Security Council's commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the situation.

North Korea reacted by stating they would consider any further reaction a „declaration of war“ and that the country would start uranium enrichment. In July 2009, Pyongyang launched several missiles in violation of Resolution 1874.

→ UN SC Resolution 1874

### April 2012: Failed test-launch

On April 13, the DPRK tried to test-launch a long-range rocket. The “satellite” flew less than two minutes before exploding in about 150 kilometers height and crashing into the Yellow sea west of the Korean peninsula. The North Korean TV informed the public only 4 hours later, declaring that the DPRK launched its first satellite. Experts were about to identify why the launch failed.

The test was conducted shortly before the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, state founder and grandfather of the current leader Kim Jong Un. Western countries suspected the action to be an illegal test for the North Korean nuclear arms program, while the North Korean government declared that the missile was meant to bring a weather satellite into the outer space.

One day before the test launch, on April 12, 2012 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon had renewed his call to refrain from a launch, noting that it is a clear violation of relevant SC resolutions. The same day the DPRK test-launched its “satellite”, Ban Ki-Moon called the action “deplorable” and urged the DPRK to respect the resolutions and to not undertake further actions that could increase tensions in the region.<sup>24</sup>



News Report on North Korean rocket launch in April 2012

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41768&Cr=Democratic&Cr1=Korea>,  
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm14228.doc.htm>,  
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41764&Cr=democratic&Cr1=korea>



### *Presidential statement* <sup>25</sup>

The UN SC reacted by releasing a presidential statement on April 16, 2012 in which it strongly condemns the test launch and stresses that this action, as well as any other use of ballistic missile technology, is a serious violation of the United Nations resolutions. It demanded that the DPRK refrains from any further launches using ballistic missile technology and to comply with previous resolutions by suspending all activities related to the country's ballistic missile program. Pyongyang must also re-establish its commitments to a moratorium on missile launches. Further sanctions are also intended by the SC.<sup>26</sup>

### *Following tensions*

Many experts expected a third nuclear test to follow the rocket launch, proving that North Korea had been able to use enriched uranium for the first time. Tensions in the region increased and conflicts occurred, such as with South Korea which accused North Korea of having blocked the air traffic.

## Reasons and Possible Solutions

The missile launches and nuclear tests of the DPRK seem to have two main purposes: On the one hand, political leaders want to demonstrate strength within the country, showing how powerful the regime is, they aim at legitimating the leadership and impressing its population. On the other hand, the U.S., Japan and South Korea are the main targets of the tests. North Korea wants to put pressure on the international community, demonstrating its power and achieving support from these countries in exchange to reducing its nuclear activities.

The following questions should be considered during the discussion: How can the imbalance between the civil use of nuclear energy and its non-proliferation be solved? How can nuclear powers such as the U.S., China and Russia regain their credibility, asking the DPRK to refrain from nuclear tests and developing nuclear arms at the same time? How to deal with parties which withdrew from the Non-proliferation-treaty (NPT)? How can pressure be put on the DPRK to stop its nuclear program?

A possible approach to solve the problem could be an international agreement including a moratorium for North Korean missile and nuclear tests, the country returning to NPT, the stop of enriching uranium and allowing international controls of all sites by the IAEA. In return, the international community could guarantee the country's sovereignty, aid shipments and a promise by the U.S. to not change the regime. The population in North Korea is suffering from hunger and bad living conditions. In exchange for help, the Korean government could be willing to agree on stopping its nuclear program. On the other hand, the regime should not be accepted as a legitimate one. Diplomatic approaches are the best ones, military options are to be avoided.

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41784&Cr=Democratic&Cr1=Korea>,  
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10610.doc.htm>

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10633.doc.htm>

UN SC resolutions have been proven to put pressure on the country, but not resolved the situation completely up to now. It is a difficult situation, because the population is starving from hunger and North Korean leaders as well as companies need to be the target group of sanctions. However, Pyongyang is being supported by China and Russia and probably cooperating with Iran. Therefore, a solution is not easy to be found.

## Further Information

### General Information

Rules of Procedure for the SC: @ <http://www.olmun.org/61-65/>

Handbook of OLMUN 2012: @ <http://www.olmun.org/61-65/>

### About the DPRK

Official website: @ <http://www.korea-dpr.com/>

The New York Times: @ <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesand-territories/northkorea/index.html>

The Guardian: @ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/north-korea>

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